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There is a deadweight loss from imposing a tax on a single commodity,
but there is no such loss from a uniform tax on all commodities with
lump-sum return, and obviously no loss if no commodity is taxed. The
object of this paper is to weave a consistent story relating these three
well established propositions, something that has hitherto been lacking.
Using a simple general equilibrium model with a CES utility function, it is
shown that, as more goods are taxed: (1) The deadweight loss per dollar
of revenue falls monotonically, and (2) the aggregate deadweight loss rises
to a maximum, then falls to zero. In particular, it is sometimes better to
tax more goods than to eliminate taxes on existing ones.
Introduction
We know, from partial equilibrium analysis, that taxing a single commodity and
returning the revenue as a lump sum imposes a "deadweight loss" or "excess
burden" on consumers. We know that there is no such loss if no goods are
taxed. We also know that taxing all commodities at the same proportional rate
and returning the revenue as a lump sum imposes no deadweight loss, because
of the zero-degree homogeneity of demand (a property that always survives
aggregation), unless there are production effects. It follows that the aggregate
deadweight loss from taxing k commodities cannot be simply k times the loss
from taxing a single commodity, at least not for k sufficiently large. While the
possibility that taxing a second commodity may reduce the deadweight loss on
*I wish to thank my colleague Stanislaw Wellisz for raising my interest in the problem
which is tackled here.
the first was spelt out in a well-known example by Harberger (1974), and is an
implication of the theory of second best1 the analysis was essentially that of
partial equilibrium.
The purpose of this paper is to fill a gap in tax theory by investigating the
relationship between the deadweight loss from a commodity tax and the number
of commodities taxed, using a fully defined, if simple, economic model in which
the partial equilibrium concept of the deadweight loss can be placed in a general
equilibrium setting but yield explicit solutions. The analysis of models with a
high degree of generality, such as those of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and
Starrett (1988), has been very impressive, but the results typically expressed as
first order conditions (often extraordinarily difficult to interpret) do not show
clearly what happens for large changes.
We will show here that, as more goods are taxed, the deadweight loss per dollar
of revenue falls monotonically, that the aggregate deadweight loss in the econ-
omy first rises then falls, reaching a maximum when some but not all goods are
taxed, that it is always better to tax more goods at a lower rate than few at a
higher rate, and that the Ramsey rule (tax the inelastic goods the most) does
not always hold. Numerical computations suggest that actual deadweight losses
may be much lower than often estimated.
1 The Model
We want to investigate what happens in a model economy with n goods in which
taxes are imposed on a proportion a of these goods and the proceeds returned
to consumers in order to close the system in a neutral way.
In order to concentrate on the effect of increasing the number of goods being
taxed, we seek a model in which the order in which the goods are taxed is
irrelevant. Thus the model should consist of goods which are symmetrically
related in both demand and supply. Since it is the consumer surplus element of
loss that is of interest, we want to eliminate production effects by having infinite
supply elasticity of each good, and to eliminate distribution effects. Finally, It
should be a true general equilibrium model, however simple.
The model which we shall use satisfies the above criteria, and may be the most
general from which explicit results can be obtained. It has the following char-
acteristics
1See Lipsey and Lancaster (1956). Second best is an old wheel that has been rediscovered
several times since.
1. Consumers are identical with identical CES utility functions, who can be
treated in the aggregate as a single consumer. The CES function enables
us to observe the effects of changing the degree of substitutability between
the goods.
2. Production using a single input (possibly a fixed proportions aggregate),
with the same constant input/output ratio for every good. This input has
no direct value as a consumption good.
3. Ownership of the single input is uniformly distributed and is the only
source of income other than distributions of tax receipts. There are no
incentive or other effects on the supply of the input to producers.
4. The government does nothing but raise taxes and distribute the proceeds
uniformly to the population, this distribution having the properties of a
lump sum distribution because of the symmetry of demand and absence
of factor supply effects.
CES Utility
Consumers have utility functions of the following form
where o ^ 1 is the elasticity of substitution.
Since consumers are identical and the utility function is homogeneous, we can
analyze the problem as though there was a single representative consumer with
income m.
For the above utility function, we have the following standard results for the
indirect utility function v(-), and the Walrasian demand function Xj(-).
v(p,m) = (£>K)^m (2)
V * ™ ' J = !,•••.»» (3)






We assume identical constant unit costs p for all commodities, so that the com-
petitive equilibrium prices without taxes will be pi = p, the resource being the
numeraire.
The total value of the aggregate resource is m, which will also be the value of
aggregate income. Demand will be given by
Xi — — for all ipn
giving utility
vlp, m) = n ^ r — (5)
V
Effect of a Tax
Now let a proportion a of the n goods (we shall ignore the integer problem) be
taxed at the same proportional rate t, the tax revenue being returned to the
consumers to give a new money income m + R, where R is the tax revenue.
To simplify, write T = 1 + t, so that the post-tax consumer price is Tp. Then
^p\-° = (aTl-a + 1 - a)p1~a n = (1 - aX)p1~an
where
X = 1 - T1-" (6)
Since T > 1, 1 > X > 0 for all a > 1, while X < 0 for a < 1.
For a taxed good, the demand equation (3) becomes
T-* m + R
[7)
_ l-aX np
For this equation to make sense, we require 1 — aX > 0 for all a < 1. If a < 1,
X < 0 and this is obviously true. For a > 1, X > 0 and then 1 — aX >1 — X =
j>i-<T > o, so the condition is satisfied for a <> 1.
Since the revenue is returned
atT~a




Y = 1 - T~a = X + tT~a (9)
Note that y , unlike X, is nonnegative for all a > 0, and so 1 — aY >1 — Y =
T~a > 0.
With taxes, v(-) is a function of a, t as well as the basic variables p, TO:
v(a,t\p,m) — (1 — aX)°-lna-1 '•—
P
11 — aY) p
2 Measuring the Loss
We shall measure the deadweight loss from taxation by the equivalent variation
as a proportion of the base income2. That is, by the value of // = fi(a, t) such
that post-tax consumers are exactly as well off as they would be if there was no
tax, but their income was reduced by a proportion /i. The determining equation
is
i>(a,£;p, TO) = v(0,0;p, (1 — fi)m) (11)
In the current model the required relationship is
1 — aY P P
from which
Since 1 - X = T1"*7 and 1 - y = T~°', it is immediate that (j,(0, t) = fi(l,t) = O
for all t. It may seem intuitively clear that /z(a, t) > 0 for 0 < a < 1, and
indeed it is true, but this cannot be determined by simple inspection of (12).
The proof is given later in the paper.
3 Deadweight Loss Relative to Revenue
Proposition 1 As the number of taxed goods is increased, the deadweight loss
from the tax relative to the revenue from the tax declines monotonically. This
is true for all values of the elasticity of substitution and all levels of tax.
In this simple model, the compensating variation could have been used, but in many cases
this measure poses problems. See Pauwels (1986).
Proof
Write r for the ratio of the deadweight loss from the tax to the revenue generated
from it. Then, from (12) and (8)
/t -\S\ /-I _ VX-^T
(13)
We have r(l) = 0, but the value of r(0) must be determined as a limit, from
which we find r(0) = \at > 0. This is equivalent to the textbook formula for a
single good and small values of t, since a can be identified with the elasticity of
demand when there are a large number of goods. Thus r(a) must be declining




Consider the two factors inside the braces, dr/da <> 0 according as the product
of these factors is <> 1. Since X, a—I are both positive (a > 1) or both negative
(a < 1), (1 - aX)1K*-1') < 1, and l+aX/(a -1) > 1 in all cases. Thus simple
inspection does not give the answer. We must consider the problem in terms of
different ranges of a.
1. For a = 2, (14) becomes
= —t
< 0
If a — 2 the graph of r{a) is that of a straight line sloping from down from
r(0) = t to r(l) = 0.
2. For a > 2, X > 0, \/{a - 1) < 1, (1 - Q ! ) 1 / ^ " 1 ) < 1 - aX/(a - 1).
We can use the inequalities (1 + x)a <> 1 + ax according as a <> 1 and
obtain
[l-aX] (7-11 I a - l j [ a - 1
da









after using the inequality Ta = ea]nT > 1 + alnT.
5. Forl > < T > 0 , X < 0 , l / ( a - l ) < - l , and 1< 1 -aX < 1 + ^ - s o that
dr
=• -T- < 0
aa
As the number of taxed goods increases, the ratio of the deadweight loss to the
tax revenue decreases steadily, to reach zero when all goods are taxed.
4 Aggregate Deadweight Loss
Proposition 2 As the number of taxed goods increases, the aggregate dead-
weight loss rises monotonically from zero to a strictly positive maximum at
some proportion a* of all goods, and then falls monotonically to reach zero at
a = 1. For a* < a < 1, removing taxes on some of the goods will actually
increase aggregate deadweight loss, while increasing the number of taxed goods
will actually decrease it.
Proof
Differentiating (12) with respect to a
_()^ f a 1-aX
da 1-aY \ a - l 1-aY
Then d/i/da = 0 at
Using the inequality ex > 1 + x it is easily shown that an expression of the form
x/(l — A~x) is increasing in x for A > 1, so that a* > 0. It can also be shown




using the argument above and the fact that X, (a — 1) are both positive or both
negative, depending on whether a >< 1.
Since /z(0) = ji(l) = 0 and it is obvious from (16) that a* is unique, \i is rising
monotonically from 0 to a*, then declining monotonically to 0 again at a = 1.
To complete the picture, we have the second order condition
i)
so there is a proper maximum at a* for all values of £, a > 0
If a — 1 we use the Cobb-Douglas form (4), from which we find fi(at) to have
properties similar to the CES case, with
Some Numerical Values
Running numerical values in the model shows that a* varies from 0.5 to 0.6 for
a 10% tax rate and values of a between 0.1 and 6.0, which covers the range of
all likely real-world elasticity values3. The value of a* increases with both a
and t.
For a = 0.5 and t = 0.25, the maximum deadweight loss (/i(a*)) is 0.31% of
GDP, and the deadweight loss per dollar of revenue is 2.6%. These are very
3The range of price elasticities for commodity groups in Houthakker and Taylor (1970) is
from about 0.2 to just over 2.0 (absolute values). These are representative of most studies.
much smaller than estimated values for a real economy with similar parameter
values given by Honohan and Irvine (1990), and much less than estimates for
another small economy by Diewert and Lawrence (1994). The naive computa-
tion, multiplying up the single commodity deadweight losses, would give 0.62%
for the aggregate deadweight loss, 6.25% for the loss ratio more comparable
to the published estimates. There is a suggestion here that traditional estimates
of deadweight losses from taxes are overstatements.
Effect of a and t
The expressions for dfi/da, dfi/dt, dr/dcr, and dr/dt are tedious to derive and
equally tedious to interpret. However, since the model has explicit solutions, it
is easy to compute solutions for different numerical values of both a and t. Both
the loss ratio r and the aggregate loss fi increase with both a and t, for given a
(except, of course if it is 0 or 1). Since this is in conformity with the standard
formula for the single-commodity loss ratio, \ot, it does not seem necessary to
provide formal analytical proofs.
The relationships in the more general model are, however, nonlinear. For exam-
ple, if a = 0.5 and the tax rate doubles from 10% to 20%, the deadweight loss if
half the goods are taxed (//(0.5)) increases by a factor of about 3.5 from 0.06%
of GNP to 0.21%, while the loss ratio (loss over revenue) less than doubles, from
1.16% to 2.17%. If a = 3, the losses are much larger, the aggregate loss on a
10% tax rate being 0.34% and the loss ratio 7.87%. For a 20% tax, the values
rise to 1.21% and 16.45% respectively.
If a is very large (above about 30 for a 10% tax rate), a* is very close to 1,
and the value of // falls very steeply as a —+ 1. At these very high substitution
elasticities a tax on a commodity causes a very large shift away from it. Because
other commodities are good substitutes, the welfare loss is relatively small, but
the revenue from the tax is even smaller, so that r(e) becomes very large but
still declines to r(l) = 0.
5 The Optimal Tax
Proposition 3 For a given revenue, there is always less deadweight loss from a
smaller tax on more commodities than from a larger tax on fewer commodities,
if the elasticity of substitution is the same for all. In particular, there is no
deadweight loss from a uniform tax on all commodities, whatever the level of
revenue raised. If there are subgroups with different elasticities of substitution,
it may be optimal to tax the group with the higher elasticity, contrary to the
Ramsey rule, because of the declining loss ratio effect.
This proposition follows immediately from the properties of r, which is decreas-
ing in a from Proposition 1, and increasing in t.
The uniformity of the elasticity of substitution (and thus the demand elasticities)
prevents a direct comparison with the Ramsey efficient tax formula4, according
to which taxes should be inversely proportional to elasticities. We can consider
the following modified version of our model, however, in which there are two
groups of goods and an additively separable utility function of the form
If we can tax all goods, the first best solution (zero deadweight loss) is to
tax every good at the same rate, whatever its group. This follows from the
homogeneity property.
But if we place a constraint that only one group can be taxed, then we have
a second best problem. If n± « ri2, so that the groups are comparable in size,
then it will better to raise the revenue from the group with the lower value of
a since r is increasing in a, a result compatible with the Ramsey rule. If the
groups are not comparable in size, the choice is not so straightforward, since r
declines with the size of the group. If the group with the higher value of a is
larger, it may be optimal to tax that group because of the size effect, contrary
to the Ramsey rule.
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